Technology metals China export controls have evolved from isolated trade measures into a systematic supply-risk architecture that now spans at least ten materials critical to Western defence, semiconductor, and clean energy industries. As of early 2026, five metals — tungsten, bismuth, tellurium, molybdenum, and indium — remain under active, unsuspended Chinese export licensing. Three others — antimony, gallium, and germanium — are operating under a temporary suspension of US-specific controls that expires November 27, 2026. This list ranks the ten highest-risk technology metals by a combined score of China’s supply dominance, export control status, and strategic criticality.
How We Ranked These Technology Metals
Each metal is scored across three factors: (1) China’s share of global production or refining capacity, sourced from USGS National Minerals Information Center data; (2) export control status — active controls rank above suspended controls, which rank above no controls; and (3) strategic criticality, weighted toward defence procurement, semiconductor fabrication, and energy transition applications.
Two entries — niobium and tantalum — are included not because China controls their export, but because Western buyers face severe supply concentration risk in the midstream. This distinction is flagged explicitly for each entry. Conflating export control risk with supply concentration risk is a common analytical error; the two require different mitigation strategies.
1. Tungsten — Active Export Controls, Not Suspended
China supply share: More than 80% of global mine production (USGS). Control status: ACTIVE. China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM Announcement No. 10, February 2025) added tungsten to its export control framework alongside tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium-related items. These controls have not been suspended. In December 2025, MOFCOM published a whitelist of 15 authorised exporters for 2026–2027 — a mechanism that concentrates supply leverage further, not one that relaxes it. Chinese tungsten exports fell 13.75% year-on-year in the January–September 2025 period.
Applications: Aerospace alloys, armour-piercing rounds and kinetic energy penetrators, cemented carbide cutting tools, electronics. Non-China sources: Vietnam, Canada, Russia — all minor. Will Parry-Jones of Wolfram Advisory is presenting on tungsten’s structural scarcity at the MMTA Vancouver 2026 conference.
2. Antimony — Controls Active; US Suspension Expires November 2026
China supply share: Approximately 48% of global mine production; dominant in refining. Control status: Export licensing active since August 2024. A US-specific ban imposed December 2024 was suspended November 9, 2025 under the US-China trade truce, with the suspension expiring November 27, 2026. Controls remain in full force for non-US markets. The legal framework is intact — the suspension is a policy lever, not structural reform.
Price impact: US antimony imports from China fell 97% between August and December 2024; prices rose approximately 200% over the same period. Applications: Flame retardants, semiconductor substrates, ammunition primers, night-vision optics, military electronics. Non-China sources: Russia, Tajikistan, Bolivia — all limited in scale. Procurement teams relying on the suspension should model for a November 2026 reimposition.
3. Gallium — Military End-Use Ban Remains; US Commercial Suspension to Nov 2026
China supply share: Approximately 80% of primary global production. Control status: Export licensing has been required since August 2023. US-specific commercial controls imposed December 2024 were suspended November 9, 2025 until November 27, 2026. Critically, the prohibition on military end-users has not been suspended and remains in force. No meaningful Western primary gallium production exists as an alternative.
Applications: Gallium arsenide and gallium nitride semiconductors, 5G infrastructure, radar systems, solar cells, LEDs. Non-China sources: Russia (minor); South Korea and Germany handle secondary processing only. Current gallium price data is tracked at gallium price data on our sister site.
4. Germanium — Military Prohibition Intact; US Suspension to Nov 2026
China supply share: Approximately 60% of global mine production; around 80% of refined output. Control status: Export licensing required since August 2023. US-specific enhanced controls from December 2024 were suspended November 2025 until November 27, 2026. As with gallium, the military end-use prohibition remains in effect and has not been suspended.
Applications: Fibre optic cables, infrared optics, night-vision systems, satellite solar cells, radiation detection equipment. All of these have direct defence procurement relevance. Non-China sources: Russia, Canada (byproduct of zinc smelting), US (minor). No near-term Western production ramp is credible at scale. Germanium price data is tracked at germanium price data on our sister site.
5. Bismuth — Active Controls, Frequently Overlooked
China supply share: Approximately 80% of global production. Control status: ACTIVE. Bismuth was included in MOFCOM Announcement No. 10 (February 2025) alongside tungsten, tellurium, molybdenum, and indium. No suspension has been applied. Bismuth receives less commercial attention than gallium or antimony, but it sits under the same active control regime as tungsten.
Applications: Pharmaceuticals (gastrointestinal treatments), lead-free solders, fire safety systems, cosmetics. Defence interest is growing as bismuth replaces lead in certain ammunition formulations. Non-China sources: Vietnam, Mexico — both minor producers.
6. Tellurium — Active Controls; Solar Supply Chain Exposed
China supply share: 50–60% of refined output (byproduct of copper refining). Control status: ACTIVE. Tellurium was included in MOFCOM Announcement No. 10 (February 2025). No suspension has been applied. Tellurium is a byproduct metal — its supply cannot be rapidly scaled independently of copper refining volumes.
Applications: Cadmium telluride (CdTe) thin-film solar panels — the primary technology of First Solar (NASDAQ: FSLR), the largest US solar manufacturer — thermoelectric devices, and phase-change memory for data storage. Non-China sources: US, Canada, Japan — all byproduct streams from copper refining. First Solar’s CdTe supply chain is the most commercially exposed Western operation.
7. Molybdenum — Active Controls; Processing Concentration the Core Risk
China supply share: Approximately 40% of global mine output; higher in processing and conversion. Control status: ACTIVE. Molybdenum was included in MOFCOM Announcement No. 10 (February 2025). No suspension has been applied. China’s processing share significantly exceeds its mining share — and processing capacity is slower to replicate in the West than mining capacity.
Applications: High-strength steels for oil pipelines and pressure vessels, superalloys for aerospace gas turbines, catalysts for oil refining. Non-China sources: Chile (Codelco, Freeport-McMoRan as byproduct), US, Canada. Western mine supply exists; the bottleneck is midstream processing concentration, which is less visible in standard supply share statistics.
8. Indium — Active Controls; Display and Defence Applications Exposed
China supply share: Approximately 55% of global refined output. Control status: ACTIVE. Indium was included in MOFCOM Announcement No. 10 (February 2025). No suspension has been applied. Like tellurium, indium is a byproduct — primarily of zinc smelting — which limits independent production scaling.
Applications: Indium tin oxide (ITO) for touchscreens and flat-panel displays, CIGS thin-film solar panels, semiconductor components, specialist solders. Indium Corporation’s Theo D. Ruas is presenting on the indium market at MMTA Vancouver 2026. Current indium price data is tracked at indium price data on our sister site.
9. Niobium — Single-Producer Concentration Risk (Not a China Control)
China supply share: China is not the dominant niobium producer. Brazil accounts for approximately 90% of global output, almost entirely through CBMM (Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração), a privately held company controlled by the Moreira Salles family. China is a major consumer and has sought equity positions in niobium supply, but does not control export. Control status: None.
The risk here is different: Western buyers face a single-point-of-failure dependency on one Brazilian producer, not Chinese export controls. A political, operational, or ownership disruption at CBMM would have immediate global consequences. Applications: High-strength low-alloy (HSLA) steels for automotive and construction, superalloys for aerospace, lithium niobate for 5G filters. Non-Brazil sources are negligible at current market prices.
10. Tantalum — Midstream Processing Concentration Risk
China supply share: China accounts for an estimated 30–40% of global tantalum processing, but is not the dominant miner. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda are the primary mine sources. Control status: None. The risk is midstream concentration: Chinese processors and, to a lesser extent, German processors handle a disproportionate share of raw material conversion.
Applications: Tantalum capacitors in mobile phones, computers, and automotive electronics; superalloys with niobium for aerospace; medical implants; chemical processing equipment. The Tantalum-Niobium International Study Center (TIC) is the authoritative industry source; TIC’s Ian Margerison is presenting at MMTA Vancouver 2026. Like niobium, tantalum requires a supply chain strategy focused on midstream diversification rather than purely on mine-source origin.
Summary: Technology Metals China Risk at a Glance
| Metal | China Supply Share | Control Status | Key Applications | Primary Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tungsten | >80% mine | ACTIVE | Defence, aerospace, cutting tools | Active controls + whitelist system |
| Antimony | ~48% mine; dominant refining | ACTIVE (US suspended to Nov 2026) | Flame retardants, ammunition, defence electronics | Suspension expires; 97% US import collapse 2024 |
| Gallium | ~80% primary | SUSPENDED to Nov 2026 (military ban intact) | Semiconductors, 5G, radar, solar | No Western primary production; military ban continues |
| Germanium | ~60% mine; ~80% refined | SUSPENDED to Nov 2026 (military ban intact) | Infrared optics, fibre optics, night-vision | Defence-critical; no credible Western ramp |
| Bismuth | ~80% | ACTIVE | Pharma, lead-free solder, ammunition | Active controls; low profile relative to risk |
| Tellurium | 50–60% refined | ACTIVE | CdTe solar (First Solar), thermoelectrics | Active controls; byproduct supply inelastic |
| Molybdenum | ~40% mine; higher processing | ACTIVE | High-strength steels, superalloys, catalysts | Active controls; processing concentration understated |
| Indium | ~55% refined | ACTIVE | Touchscreens, CIGS solar, semiconductors | Active controls; byproduct supply inelastic |
| Niobium | ~90% from Brazil (CBMM) | CONCENTRATION RISK | HSLA steels, superalloys, 5G filters | Single-producer dependency (not China-specific) |
| Tantalum | 30–40% processing | CONCENTRATION RISK | Capacitors, superalloys, medical, aerospace | Midstream processing concentration |
The Bigger Picture — China’s Export Control Strategy
China’s export control regime is not a series of reactive trade measures — it is a multi-year, systematically expanded legal architecture. The sequence runs from gallium and germanium licensing (August 2023) through graphite controls (late 2023), antimony licensing (August 2024), the December 2024 US-specific bans on antimony, gallium, and germanium, and the February 2025 MOFCOM Announcement No. 10 adding tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum, and indium. Rare earth export restrictions followed in April and October 2025. Each expansion has tested Western response capacity and found it limited.
The November 2025 suspension of US-specific controls on antimony, gallium, and germanium was a diplomatic concession tied to broader US-China trade negotiations, not evidence of structural retreat. The legal instruments remain in place. The suspension expires November 27, 2026. Military end-use prohibitions for gallium and germanium were not included in the suspension. Western buyers and procurement teams who have used the suspension period to normalise supply should treat it as a reprieve window, not a resolution.
The practical response for procurement teams involves three parallel tracks: dual-sourcing from non-Chinese producers where any alternative exists (however limited), building strategic inventory above normal commercial stock levels before November 2026, and engaging with government stockpile programmes — the US National Defense Stockpile and the EU Critical Raw Materials Act both provide frameworks for public-private coordination. The critical minerals demand picture from data centres and defence is compounding pressure on the same metals China now controls. The November 2026 suspension expiry date is the most significant near-term risk event in the technology metals supply chain.
Which technology metals are under active Chinese export controls in 2026?
Five technology metals remain under active, unsuspended Chinese export controls as of 2026: tungsten, bismuth, tellurium, molybdenum, and indium — all added under MOFCOM Announcement No. 10 in February 2025. These controls require export licensing and have not been subject to any suspension.
What technology metals China controls are currently suspended?
China suspended US-specific export controls on antimony, gallium, and germanium on November 9, 2025, as part of the US-China trade truce. The suspension runs until November 27, 2026. Standard export licensing frameworks for these metals remain in place for non-US buyers, and the military end-use prohibitions on gallium and germanium were not suspended.
Why is tungsten at the top of the technology metals China risk list?
Tungsten ranks first because it combines active, unsuspended export controls with a Chinese mine production share exceeding 80% and direct applications in defence — including armour-piercing ammunition and kinetic energy penetrators. The December 2025 whitelist system, which restricts authorised exporters to 15 approved entities, adds an additional operational control layer. No credible Western alternative supply exists at scale.
What happened to antimony prices after China imposed export controls?
After China introduced export licensing for antimony in August 2024 and imposed a US-specific ban in December 2024, US antimony imports from China fell approximately 97% between August and December 2024. Prices rose around 200% over the same period. The US-specific ban has been suspended until November 2026, but the underlying supply concentration and legal control framework remain unchanged.
Are gallium and germanium still restricted by China in 2026?
Commercial exports of gallium and germanium to the US are operating under a suspension of the December 2024 US-specific bans, running until November 27, 2026. However, the broader export licensing requirements introduced in August 2023 remain in force for all markets. Critically, the prohibition on gallium and germanium exports to military end-users has not been suspended and continues to apply globally.
Which technology metals at risk from China are most important for defence?
Tungsten (armour-piercing rounds, kinetic energy penetrators), antimony (ammunition primers, night-vision optics, military electronics), gallium (GaN radar and 5G military communications), and germanium (infrared optics and night-vision systems) carry the highest direct defence procurement exposure. All four have Chinese supply shares of 48–80% and are subject to active or recently suspended export controls.
