Europe’s EU critical minerals strategy is falling behind the United States and China in the race to secure defence-critical metals, with a dormant antimony mine in Slovakia emerging as a case study in the bloc’s inability to translate policy into funded projects.
The Trojarova project, located in the Little Carpathians near Bratislava and owned by Canada-based Military Metals Corp, holds one of Europe’s most significant antimony deposits. If reactivated, the company says it could supply up to a third of the continent’s annual antimony demand — approximately 6,000 tonnes — and be operational within two to three years. So far, no EU offtake agreement has been secured.
EU Critical Minerals Strategy: What the CRMA Set Out to Do
The bloc’s formal framework, the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), adopted in 2023, set targets to extract at least 10% of annual consumption of key elements domestically and process 40% within EU borders. The legislation identified lithium as a priority and catalysed some investment in battery supply chains.
But as the US and China pivoted toward metals with direct military applications — antimony, gallium, germanium — Brussels has not followed. EU officials lack both the mandate and the funding to pursue a comparable defence-metals strategy, according to people familiar with internal deliberations cited by Bloomberg.
Germany’s €1 billion raw materials fund has supported only two projects to date, and applicants face qualification hurdles that limit its reach. The US government’s investment arm, by contrast, recently committed $5 million to restart a dormant antimony mine in Northern Macedonia.
The Trojarova Gap: Why Europe Is Losing Ground
Antimony is used in munitions, night vision goggles, infrared sensors, fire retardants, and nuclear and renewable energy applications. Military demand accounts for up to 15% of global consumption. China controls approximately 80% of global antimony processing — a concentration that makes Western alternative supply a strategic priority.
“Antimony is a textbook example of a small-volume mineral with outsized strategic impact,” Sabrina Schulz, Germany director at the European Initiative for Energy Security, told Bloomberg. “Europe is almost entirely import-dependent, and supply is highly concentrated.”
Military Metals, with a market capitalisation of under $30 million, cannot fund Trojarova’s development alone. The company needs partners to invest in both mining and associated refining capacity — potentially in Germany or Sweden — to establish a complete supply chain from extraction to defence-ready ingots. No EU government has stepped forward.
One US company has already approached Military Metals to inspect the site. The pattern — American capital moving faster on European strategic assets than European governments — reflects a structural gap the EU has yet to close. For context on current antimony prices and the market dynamics driving this interest, CMN’s price tracker covers spot rates and China export control developments.
Financing Remains the Central Bottleneck
The EU-US accord reached last month to coordinate critical minerals supply chain policies — struck partly in response to fears about being excluded from any US-China summit deal — is viewed by Military Metals as a potential catalyst for joint investment and offtake partnerships at Trojarova.
But coordination agreements have not yet produced capital. “Member states are still reluctant to pool resources for mining and processing projects beyond their borders, even as geoeconomic realities demand it,” Schulz said. “Financing remains the central bottleneck.”
Germany’s internal divisions illustrate the problem. Frank Hartmann, the German foreign ministry official responsible for Asia, told a Berlin event in March that Europe is “operating on a too limited scale” and must commit long-term funds to critical minerals over the next decade “otherwise we never escape this dependency trap.”
Thomas Hüser, chairman of Military Metals and a former Glencore manager, put it directly: “What we are still lacking is not ambition, but execution. Europe’s raw materials strategy remains fragmented, slow, and often disconnected from industrial reality.”
Where the EU Critical Minerals Strategy Stands in 2026
The CRMA remains the bloc’s primary policy instrument, but its implementation has focused on battery metals rather than defence-critical materials. The technology metals most exposed to China export controls — antimony, gallium, germanium, tungsten — sit outside the CRMA’s practical funding reach as currently operated.
Spain and Brazil signed a memorandum of understanding last month, and similar EU-producer agreements are accumulating. But US bilateral deals with the same countries typically involve larger funding commitments and more concrete timelines.
For procurement professionals and supply chain managers tracking European critical minerals developments, the Trojarova situation is a live test of whether EU rhetoric on strategic autonomy can be converted into funded projects before American or other capital moves first.
The outcome of the Trump-Xi summit this week adds further urgency. If the US and China reach any accommodation on critical minerals trade, Europe risks being further marginalised in both the supply chain and the diplomatic frame that shapes it.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.
What is the EU critical minerals strategy?
The EU’s critical minerals framework is anchored in the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), adopted in 2023. It sets targets to extract 10% of annual consumption domestically and process 40% within EU borders. Implementation has focused primarily on battery metals such as lithium, with defence-critical materials such as antimony and gallium receiving less funding attention.
Why is Europe struggling to secure antimony supply?
China controls approximately 80% of global antimony processing, and European governments have been slow to fund alternative projects. Germany’s €1 billion raw materials fund has supported only two projects to date. Projects like the Trojarova mine in Slovakia — which could supply up to a third of EU annual antimony demand — remain unfunded despite their strategic significance.
What is the Trojarova antimony project?
Trojarova is a former Soviet-era antimony mine in the Little Carpathians near Bratislava, Slovakia, acquired by Canada-based Military Metals Corp. If reactivated, it could produce enough antimony to cover around a third of Europe’s annual demand of approximately 6,000 tonnes, potentially within two to three years, subject to investment and refining partnerships being secured.
How does the US approach to critical minerals differ from the EU’s?
The US has pursued direct government investment, bilateral supply agreements with resource-rich nations, and price floor mechanisms that guarantee minimum prices for producers. The EU has signed memoranda of understanding but has deployed less capital and moved more slowly. The US government recently committed $5 million to restart an antimony mine in North Macedonia, while no comparable EU funding has been directed at Trojarova.
What is antimony used for in defence applications?
Antimony is used in munitions, night vision goggles, and infrared sensors. Defence applications account for up to 15% of global antimony demand. It is also used in fire retardants and nuclear and renewable energy applications.
